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Bidirectional contact tracing could dramatically
improve COVID-19 control
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Contact tracing is critical to controlling COVID-19, but most protocols only “forward-trace” to
notify people who were recently exposed. Using a stochastic branching-process model, we
find that “bidirectional” tracing to identify infector individuals and their other infectees
robustly improves outbreak control. In our model, bidirectional tracing more than doubles the
reduction in effective reproduction number (Reff) achieved by forward-tracing alone, while
dramatically increasing resilience to low case ascertainment and test sensitivity. The greatest
gains are realised by expanding the manual tracing window from 2 to 6 days pre-symptom-
onset or, alternatively, by implementing high-uptake smartphone-based exposure notifica-
tion; however, to achieve the performance of the former approach, the latter requires nearly
all smartphones to detect exposure events. With or without exposure notification, our results
suggest that implementing bidirectional tracing could dramatically improve COVID-19
control.
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-20325-7 OPEN
1Max Planck Institute for Biology of Ageing, Joseph-Stelzmann-Str. 296, 50937 Cologne, Germany. 2 Alt. Technology Labs, Berkeley, CA 94702, USA.
3Media Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. 4 Department of Mathematics & Statistics, Boston University,
Boston, MA 02215, USA. 5 Biomathematics Graduate Program and Department of Mathematics, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695, USA.
✉email: esvelt@mit.edu









Contact tracing, isolation, and testing are some of the mostpowerful public health interventions available. The nationsthat have most effectively controlled the ongoing COVID-
19 pandemic are noteworthy for conducting comprehensive and
sophisticated tracing and testing1. Current “forward-tracing”
protocols seek to identify and isolate individuals who may have
been infected by the known case, preventing continued trans-
mission (Fig. 1a). For example, the European Union and World
Health Organization call for the identification of potential
infectees starting 2 days prior to the development of symptoms2,3.
However, chains of SARS-CoV-2 transmission may persist
despite excellent medical monitoring and forward-tracing pro-
grams due to substantial rates of undiagnosed or asymptomatic
transmission4 (Fig. 1a). Asymptomatic carriers, who reportedly
bear equivalent viral loads to patients exhibiting symptoms5, have
been estimated to account for 18%6 to 79%7 of cases, with mul-
tiple population surveys indicating intermediate values around
45%8–10. Moreover, a large fraction of transmission is known to
be driven by superspreading events11, suggesting that methods
that preferentially identify, test and trace potential superspreaders
would be especially valuable in reducing transmission.
We hypothesized that “bidirectional” contact tracing could
identify and isolate undiscovered branches of the transmission
tree, preventing many additional cases—especially when asymp-
tomatic carriers are common or case ascertainment rates are low
(Fig. 1b). Bidirectional contact tracing uses “reverse-tracing” to
identify the parent case who infected a known case, then con-
tinues tracing to iteratively discover other cases related to the
parent. It has been successfully used to identify clusters and
community transmission in Japan12 and Singapore13,14, but is
otherwise uncommon. Previous studies of COVID-19 contact
tracing have largely neglected the possibility of gains from
bidirectional tracing, with most models designed such that only
forward-tracing can occur.
We further hypothesized that bidirectional tracing would be
most effective using a “hybrid” system that supplements manual
tracing (Fig. 1c) with digital exposure notification. Numerous
ongoing efforts aim to use smartphones emitting randomized
Bluetooth and/or ultrasound “chirps” to notify people exposed to
infected individuals (Fig. 1d, e). Digital approaches theoretically
offer considerable advantages in speed15, scale, efficacy16, and
confidentiality17, suggesting that they may offer an effective
method of implementing bidirectional tracing. However, their use
in this context has not previously been investigated, and existing
implementations primarily focus on “forward-notifying” cases
exposed during the peak infectious window of the notifier18.
To investigate the efficacy of bidirectional contact tracing and
digital exposure notification, we adapted and extended a sto-
chastic branching-process model of SARS-CoV-2 forward-
tracing19 and used it to explore the efficacy of different tracing
strategies under plausible epidemiological scenarios. We find that
either expanding the manual tracing window to enable more
Fig. 1 Forward-only and bidirectional contact tracing and digital exposure notification. a Notifying people exposed to known cases (black) and isolating
them (green) can prevent further transmission, but will miss asymptomatic and undiagnosed cases (gray) and descendants. b Bidirectional tracing also
notifies and tests potential infectors, enabling isolation of additional cases. c Manual contact tracing requires individuals to share recent contacts with
health authorities. d In digital exposure notification, smartphones broadcast rotating pseudorandom “chirps” and record those emitted by nearby devices48.
e Individuals diagnosed with COVID-19 can “opt-in” by uploading broadcasted chirps to a diagnosis server48. All devices frequently check the server and
alert the user if the calculated exposure exceeds a threshold set by the local health authority. In hybrid manual+digital systems, human tracers would seek
to identify contacts without smartphones.
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effective bidirectional tracing or implementing high-uptake
bidirectional digital exposure notification could substantially
improve COVID-19 control.
Results
In our model, each case generates a number of new cases drawn
from a negative binomial distribution, with incubation and
generation-time distributions based on the published literature
(Table 1 and Supplementary Table 1). Cases could be identified
and isolated based on symptoms alone or through contact tracing
(Methods). We assumed that symptomatic cases required a
positive test before initiating contact tracing, as is the case in the
EU2 and most US jurisdictions. Ninety percent of cases were
assumed to comply with isolation, after which they generated no
further child cases. Each outbreak was initialized with 20 index
cases to minimize stochastic extinction and designated as “con-
trolled” if it reached extinction (zero new cases) before reaching
10,000 cumulative cases. Effective reproduction numbers (Reff)
were computed as the mean number of child cases produced per
case.
We began by investigating a median scenario in which 10% of
transmission was assumed to be environmental (and therefore
untraceable), 48% of transmission occurred pre-symptomatically,
and 45% of cases were asymptomatic with 50% infectiousness.
For the initial analysis we assumed a fixed basic reproduction
number (R0) of 2.5, a 50% ascertainment rate for symptomatic
cases, and a test sensitivity of 70%, but explored other
values below.
Bidirectional manual tracing with an expanded tracing window
could more than double efficacy. In our initial scenario, manual
forward tracing and isolation of contacts occurring up to 48-h
before symptom onset or diagnosis per current guidelines2 is
predicted to reduce Reff by as much as 0.24 relative to the no-
tracing baseline (Fig. 2a). Extending the time window for
forward-tracing contacts beyond 2 days yielded negligible addi-
tional benefit (Fig. 2a and Supplementary Fig. 1). Switching from
forward-only to bidirectional tracing without altering the 48-h
tracing window further reduced Reff by up to 0.24, roughly
doubling the benefit relative to no tracing.
Due to the extended generation and incubation times of
COVID-19, the contact between an infector individual and their
infectee will often occur more than 48-h prior to the latter’s onset
of symptoms20. Hence, extending the tracing window should
substantially improve the efficacy of bidirectional tracing. As
expected, extending the window for manual bidirectional tracing
to 6 days pre-symptom onset resulted in a dramatic further
reduction in Reff in our model, yielding values up to 0.42 lower
than with a 2-day window (Fig. 2a, b and Supplementary Fig. 1)—
an improvement in performance of roughly 85% relative to 2-day
bidirectional tracing and 275% relative to forward-only tracing.
Since real tracing programs—mostly focused on forward tracing
with a 2-day window2,3—are likely to detect some but not all
reverse contacts occurring up to 2 days before symptom onset,
our model suggests the real gains of extending the tracing window
would fall somewhere between these two extremes.
Our results demonstrate the importance of including bidirec-
tional approaches when investigating the effectiveness of contact
tracing. If they are borne out in practice, extending the tracing
window to 6 days while swiftly testing early contacts would
dramatically improve COVID-19 control.
Digital exposure notification is fragile to network fragmenta-
tion. In principle, digital exposure notification can instanta-





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-20325-7 ARTICLE
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |          (2021) 12:232 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-20325-7 |www.nature.com/naturecommunications 3
duration of the data-retention period, which is typically 14 days21.
Past studies of COVID-19 contact tracing have suggested that
such methods could effectively control the pandemic, even in the
absence of manual tracing programs16. In principle, the long
data-retention period of digital tracing systems should enable a
high degree of bidirectional tracing; however, previous studies
have largely neglected this possibility, and existing digital tracing
systems typically prioritize notifying contacts infected during
peak infectiousness of the known case (i.e., forward tracing)18.
In our model, implementing digital exposure notification in the
absence of manual tracing was highly effective when all cases
participate in the digital system, with Reff values approaching 1.0
(Fig. 2c and Supplementary Fig. 2). This performance, however,
was highly sensitive to uptake of the digital system: even small
decreases in the proportion of individuals carrying a participating
smartphone or (to a lesser extent) sharing their exposure data
upon diagnosis resulted in a substantial increase in the effective
reproduction number of the epidemic (Fig. 2c and Supplementary
Fig. 3). Even if every individual with a smartphone (~80% of
adults in the US22) participated in the system, and 90% of those
shared their data upon diagnosis, the Reff achieved was only
slightly lower than that of manual bidirectional tracing with a 2-
day window, and substantially higher than manual-only tracing
with a 6-day window (Fig. 2a, c). As a result of this fragility, our
results suggest that digital exposure notification alone is unlikely
to be a viable method for controlling COVID-19.
Hybridizing manual tracing with digital may offer an alter-
native path to high performance. In practice, almost no jur-
isdiction is proposing to exclusively control COVID-19 through
Fig. 2 Comparing forward and bidirectional contact tracing at R0= 2.5. a Mean Reff achieved by manual tracing with 2-day and 6-day manual tracing
windows. b Neighbor-averaged contour plot, showing mean Reff achieved by bidirectional manual tracing as a function of the probability of trace success
and the width of the manual tracing window. c Neighbor-averaged contour plot, depicting Reff achieved by digital exposure notification in the absence of
manual tracing as a function of smartphone coverage and data-sharing, assuming 90% probability of trace success. d Mean Reff achieved using hybrid
manual+digital tracing, assuming 90% data sharing and 53% or 80% smartphone coverage. e, f Neighbor-averaged contour plots, depicting Reff achieved
by hybrid tracing as a function of smartphone coverage and data-sharing, assuming 90% probability of trace success and a e 2-day or f 6-day manual
tracing window. All panels assume median disease parameters (Table 1). “Probability of trace success” refers to trace attempts that are not otherwise
blocked by environmental transmission or fragmentation of the digital network.
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digital exposure notification, but rather to supplement traditional
manual tracing with digital tools. The two methods have com-
plementary strengths and weaknesses: digital tracing is fast,
scalable, and could be easily adapted to trace bidirectionally, but
is highly fragile to network fragmentation; manual tracing is
slower and more labor-intensive, but more robust. A hybrid of
the two approaches might thus outperform either approach used
in isolation.
We investigated the effects of supplementing manual tracing
with digital exposure notification for two distinct digital
scenarios. In our “low-uptake” condition, 53% of cases possessed
chirping smartphones, corresponding to roughly two-thirds of
smartphone users; this is consistent with early survey data on
willingness to download a contact-tracing app23,24. In our “high-
uptake” condition, 80% of cases possessed chirping smartphones,
corresponding to virtually all smartphone users in the US22. In
both cases, we assumed that 90% of diagnosed cases upload their
broadcasted chirps upon diagnosis.
In the absence of bidirectional tracing, a hybrid approach
offered few benefits over manual tracing, reducing Reff by up to
0.06 in the low-uptake condition and 0.12 in the high-uptake
condition compared to manual tracing alone (Fig. 2d and
Supplementary Fig. 4). Bidirectional hybrid tracing with a 6-day
manual window provided larger benefits compared to manual
tracing, with a relative drop in Reff of up to 0.14 in the low-uptake
condition and up to 0.26 in the high-uptake condition. By far the
largest relative gains, however, were seen when the manual
tracing window was restricted to 2 days pre-symptom onset: in
this case, supplementing manual with digital tracing reduced Reff
by up to 0.21 in the low-uptake case and up to 0.42 in the high-
uptake case compared to manual tracing alone. Since manual
bidirectional tracing with a 2-day window achieved a reduction in
Reff of up to 0.48, these results suggest that implementing high-
uptake exposure notification alongside manual tracing could
roughly double the efficacy of current contact tracing efforts at
reducing COVID-19 transmission.
When interpreting these results, it is important to distinguish
between the absolute and relative efficacy of hybrid tracing.
Increasing the manual tracing window from 2 to 6 days
substantially increased the absolute efficacy of bidirectional
hybrid tracing in both the high- and low-uptake conditions
(Fig. 2d–f and Supplementary Fig. 5); however, since increasing
the tracing window also increased the efficacy of manual-only
bidirectional tracing (Fig. 2a), the relative benefit of supplement-
ing manual with digital tracing was reduced (Supplementary
Fig. 4). When the manual window is short, even low-uptake
digital tracing can improve performance by providing an
alternative avenue for effective bidirectional tracing; when it is
long, only very high-uptake digital tracing offers a substantial
additional advantage.
Bidirectional tracing is more robust to low case ascertainment
and test sensitivity. Our results thus far assume that 50% of
symptomatic cases can be identified based on symptoms alone,
corresponding to an overall ascertainment rate (including
asymptomatic cases) of roughly 22%. However, estimates of real-
world symptomatic ascertainment rates for COVID-19 have
varied dramatically country-by-country and over time, from
under 10% in some of the worst-hit countries to over 90% in
Australia4. To investigate the effect of case ascertainment on
epidemic control, we varied the proportion of symptomatic cases
identified, while holding the baseline probability of trace success
(excluding environmental transmission and network fragmenta-
tion) constant at 90%.
Unsurprisingly, reducing ascertainment of symptomatic cases
impaired epidemic control (Fig. 3a and Supplementary Figs. 6
and 27). However, bidirectional tracing was considerably more
robust to poor case ascertainment than forward-only tracing,
resulting in dramatically lower Reff values across a wide range of
ascertainment rates (Supplementary Fig. 7). When ascertainment
rates are extremely low, as occurred in the United Kingdom
Fig. 3 Bidirectional tracing under reduced ascertainment and test sensitivity. a Mean Reff achieved by different tracing strategies as a function of the
percentage of symptomatic cases that can be identified by health authorities on the basis of symptoms alone, assuming 70% test sensitivity. b Mean Reff
achieved by different tracing strategies as a function of test sensitivity, assuming 50% ascertainment of symptomatic cases. c As in (b), but allowing
contact tracing to be initiated from symptomatic cases on the basis of symptoms alone (i.e., without a positive test result). All panels assume 90%
probability of trace success, a 6-day manual tracing window, high (80%) smartphone coverage, and median disease parameters (Table 1). Isolation on the
basis of symptoms can dampen the outbreak even in the absence of tracing.
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through much of the spring4, bidirectional tracing dramatically
outperforms current protocols.
We also investigated the effect of testing requirements and
sensitivity on the efficacy of contact tracing. If symptomatic cases
were traced immediately based on symptoms alone (without
requiring a positive test result), both forward-only and bidirec-
tional tracing were fairly robust to drops in test sensitivity, with
Reff values increasing only slowly as sensitivity falls (Fig. 3b). Our
baseline assumption, however, was that a positive test result was
required to trace the contacts of any case, in line with common
practice in the UK, US and EU2. Under these conditions, the
efficacy of forward-tracing was dramatically more dependent on a
high test sensitivity: low sensitivities yielded greatly increased Reff
values in forward-only scenarios (Fig. 3c and Supplementary
Figs. 6, 7, and 26), consistent with previous modeling studies
reporting impaired performance under these conditions25. In
sharp contrast, the performance of bidirectional tracing remained
relatively robust to changes in test sensitivity.
The predicted benefits of bidirectional tracing are robust to
changing the basic reproduction number. To evaluate the epi-
demiological robustness of our findings, we repeated our analysis
using R0 values ranging from 1.0 to 4.0 (Fig. 4, left)9,16,26–28. We
assumed a 90% baseline trace success probability, a 6-day manual
trace window, immediate tracing of symptomatic cases, and high
uptake of the digital system when present. A wider range of
assumptions are explored in Supplementary Figs. 8–28.
For all tracing strategies investigated, Reff varied roughly
linearly as a function of R0 (Fig. 4, top-left). Bidirectional hybrid
tracing was consistently the most effective strategy, with Reff
values roughly 85% of those achieved under bidirectional manual
tracing (Supplementary Fig. 29). The exception to this was when
Reff < 1, in which case the Reff values achieved by different
strategies converged (Fig. 4 and Supplementary Fig. 29). Both
manual and hybrid bidirectional tracing dramatically outper-
formed forward-only approaches across a wide range of R0 values.
Reducing uptake of the digital system from 80% to 53% of cases
largely abrogated the advantage of hybrid over manual
approaches (Supplementary Fig. 9). However, if the manual
tracing window was also constrained to 2 days pre-symptom
onset per current protocols, even low-uptake hybrid tracing
substantially outperformed the manual approaches (Supplemen-
tary Figs. 10 and 11).
Unlike Reff, the proportion of outbreaks controlled was highly
nonlinear with varying R0 (Fig. 4, bottom-left). Within a critical
window, small reductions in R0 resulted in large increases in
control probability across all forms of tracing. Hybrid bidirec-
tional tracing exhibited the greatest degree of outperformance
when 1.25 < R0 < 3.25. When R0 ≤ 1.25, manual and hybrid
tracing both achieved nearly 100% control, while when R0 ≥
3.25, no strategy achieved control probabilities over 10%.
The predicted benefits of bidirectional tracing are robust to
changing transmission parameters. While COVID-19 is clearly
a challenging disease to control, there remains substantial
uncertainty around the exact rates of asymptomatic, presympto-
matic, and environmental transmission. To explore a wider range
of scenarios, we aggregated our collective best estimates to define
optimistic and pessimistic values for these parameters, with 5/
15% environmental transmission, 38/53% pre-symptomatic
transmission, and 40/55% asymptomatic carriers, which were
45/60% as infectious as symptomatic cases. We repeated our
simulations under these new assumptions for a range of R0 values
(Fig. 4, middle and right).
Fig. 4 Effect of R0 and disease parameters on performance. (top row) Mean Reff achieved and (bottom row) mean % of outbreaks controlled by different
tracing strategies as a function of the basic reproduction number R0, assuming (left) median, (middle) optimistic or (right) pessimistic disease parameters
(Table 1), assuming 50% ascertainment of symptomatic cases, 70% test sensitivity, 90% probability of trace success, a 6-day manual tracing window, and
high (80%) smartphone coverage (Table 1). Error bars in the bottom row represent 95% credible intervals across 1000 runs under a uniform beta prior.
Isolation on the basis of symptoms can dampen the outbreak at low R0, even in the absence of tracing.
ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-20325-7
6 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |          (2021) 12:232 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-20325-7 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications
While hybrid bidirectional tracing continued to robustly
outperform other configurations (Supplementary Figs. 8–12) in
terms of Reff, the probability of outbreak control varied
substantially between scenarios. In the optimistic scenario,
high-uptake hybrid bidirectional tracing was sufficient to reliably
control outbreaks whenever R0 ≤ 1.75, while in the pessimistic
scenario reliable control was only achieved at R0 ≤ 1.25.
Modifying the uptake of the digital system or the width of the
manual tracing window had similar qualitative impacts in all
scenarios (Supplementary Figs. 9–11).
To summarize the effects of different approaches, we compared
the predicted Reff values achieved under all three scenarios in the
absence of other interventions (Fig. 5 and Supplementary Figs. 30–
32). Across scenarios, the Reff reduction achieved by 2-day
bidirectional manual tracing was roughly 1.7–2× that achieved by
forward-only tracing. Increasing the manual tracing window to 6-
days further improved performance by roughly 75–95% relative to
2-day bidirectional tracing. Supplementing 2-day bidirectional
manual tracing with low-uptake exposure notification improved
the performance by 40–60%, while high-uptake exposure notifica-
tion yielded an improvement of 90–105%.
Discussion
Given the tremendous suffering inflicted by the COVID-19
pandemic and the critical role of contact-tracing systems in its
control, there is an urgent need to optimize the implementation
of these systems. To combat the high rates of asymptomatic
carriers and low case ascertainment, tracing programs must use
their limited resources to find as many new cases as possible.
Since 10–20% of infected individuals are responsible for most
transmission events11, individuals known to have infected at least
one person are statistically much more likely to have infected
others. This suggests that finding and tracing infectors may be
important, especially when many cases are otherwise escaping
detection. However, most existing tracing protocols and exposure
notification systems ignore contacts from more than 48-h before
symptom onset and consequently struggle to identify infectors.
Even so, our model predicts that the benefit of tracing infectors
for those few cases that develop rapidly enough is considerable:
jurisdictions that swiftly test and trace all contacts, including the
few infectors among them, reduce the basic reproduction number
of the virus by twice as much as those that only trace forwards.
Even the best 48-h manual tracing protocols could be sub-
stantially improved by extending the time window for identifying
contacts. Our model suggests two possible ways to achieve this:
firstly, by expanding the manual tracing window to detect and
immediately test early contacts, and secondly, by implementing a
comprehensive and high-uptake digital exposure notification
system that can perform the same function. If the manual tracing
window could be extended to 6 days pre-symptom onset while
maintaining the proportion of contacts identified, or if almost all
smartphone users participate in the digital exposure notification
system, our model predicts a second approximate doubling of the
Reff reduction achieved.
For different reasons, both of these conditions would be
challenging to achieve in practice. Even accounting for recurring
contacts, simply increasing the width of the manual tracing
window would require many more contacts to be traced and
quarantined per identified case, just when the greater effectiveness
of bidirectional tracing would be finding more cases. The mag-
nitude of this effect depends, among other things, on the network
structure of the population and the number and frequency of
recurring contacts—as an upper bound, assuming no recurring
contacts and a uniform rate of new contacts per day, such a
change would increase the number of contacts traced in pro-
portion to the width of the tracing window. Our model, which
takes no account of these factors, is ill-equipped to quantify this
aspect of the policy question. Future work should investigate the
efficacy of bidirectional tracing using a wider variety of epide-
miological models, to better quantify the ratio of benefits
versus costs.
While the magnitude of the cost of bidirectional tracing is
difficult to quantify in the present setting, these costs can
nevertheless be minimized through efficient prioritization of
forward and backward tracing. Since people found through
backward-tracing are unlikely to remain highly infectious, there is
less of a case for quarantine in advance of a positive test.
Therefore, manual programs might prioritize backward-tracing
and testing contacts from 3–6 days before symptom onset, and
forward-tracing from identified infectors. This focus on infection
clusters would be similar to Japan’s tracing program12. Exposure
Fig. 5 Performance of different tracing strategies relative to current practice. Mean effective reproduction number obtained under (left) median,
(middle) optimistic, and (right) pessimistic scenarios (Table 1), assuming an R0 of 2.5 and a 90% baseline probability of trace success across 1000 runs.
Blue double dagger symbols indicate conditions roughly corresponding to current practice in most regions. Low and high uptake correspond to 53% and
80% of cases, respectively, having chirp-enabled smartphones. Without tracing, forward and bidirectional are equivalent.
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notification could make a similar distinction by sending a dif-
ferent message to early contacts requesting that they get tested as
soon as possible. Under this approach, the only increase in
quarantine numbers would result from forward-tracing from
confirmed infectors to identify their other potential infectees.
While the efficacy of bidirectional manual tracing depends on
the ability to successfully implement an expanded tracing window
with limited resources, digital exposure notification depends
critically on the proportion of individuals participating in the
system—in particular, the proportion of cases possessing a
chirping smartphone. Doubling the effectiveness of the best
current 48-h contact tracing programs would require a partici-
pation rate of 80% (i.e., almost every current smartphone user), a
level unlikely to be achieved under the current plans for opt-in
participation. Making all smartphones listen for and record chirps
by default could weaken the dependence on the uptake,
improving performance while avoiding the privacy implications
of automatic chirping. As suggested above, prioritizing prompt
testing and tracing of earlier contacts, while encouraging recent
contacts to self-quarantine, could help dampen transmission
while minimizing the number of false-positive notifications.
We stress-tested our conclusions with a wide range of plausible
parameter combinations and possible values of R0. Importantly,
the relative efficacy of bidirectional tracing compared to forward-
only further increases when symptomatic case ascertainment is
below 50%, as has been true across much of the world. Since case
ascertainment plummets when cases are surging, some regions
have ceased contact tracing under such conditions. However, our
results suggest that implementing some form of bidirectional
tracing can maintain the utility of contact tracing even when a
local epidemic appears out of control.
Despite this stress-testing, our conclusions must be considered
in the context of our model, which, while less idealized than many
of its predecessors, has limitations. In addition to only con-
sidering infected individuals, it makes no distinction between
mild and severe symptoms and does not consider demographic,
geospatial, or behavioral variation between cases. Since only true
cases are included in the model, only the sensitivity of testing is
considered; in reality, the balance between test sensitivity and
specificity is a crucial trade-off. The efficacy of a real-world tra-
cing program will also depend on the availability of timely
COVID-19 testing15 and high adherence to quarantine
requests16,19,29,30, while digital systems will require efficient
algorithms with acceptable sensitivity and specificity.
These caveats aside, there is considerable evidence that bidirec-
tional tracing can be feasibly implemented in practice. Locales such
as Singapore13,14 and Washington State31 have employed bidirec-
tional tracing to determine whether community transmission is
occurring, while Japan’s protocol explicitly aims to identify and
trace individuals responsible for infection clusters12. Together with
these promising empirical findings, our results indicate that bidir-
ectional contact tracing could play an essential and potentially
decisive role in controlling COVID-19 elsewhere in the world.
Reporting Summary. Further information on research design is
available in the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to
this article.
Data availability
The data supporting the findings of this study are in the main manuscript and the
Supplementary Information, and are available at https://github.com/willbradshaw/covid-
bidirectional-tracing.
Code availability
Code for configuring and running the model is publicly available at https://github.com/
willbradshaw/covid-bidirectional-tracing32.
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